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Chapter 2
Technology Policy, R&D, and Innovation in China 
Traditional Approaches, and New Challenges
Andras Szekely-Doby
Abstract: China’s long term development path has always been strongly 
infl uenced by its own ways of innovation and invention. Though around one 
thousand years ago China had been undoubtedly the most advanced country in 
the world, by the 17th century Europe had surpassed it. And when the PRC was 
founded in 1949, it was only a poor, severely underdeveloped country without 
adequate, modern technologies. In the last three decades, however, the country has 
achieved remarkable success in economic terms: China has become the second 
largest economy in the world, and its new economic, fi nancial and trading power 
has made it clear that the dominance of the USA and Europe has passed. At the 
same time China is still lagging behind technologically. Though there are huge 
efforts to narrow the gap, it is extremely diffi cult to build up a new technological 
and innovation system without deep, organic foundations. China, however, has rich 
experience of innovations from the past, and the question is whether it is possible to 
use them to formulate a new technology policy. In this paper I will try to examine 
China’s technology system, its functioning and its prospects, while comparing 
it with the traditional ways of innovations in China. I would like to show that 
current technology policy is, at least partly, based upon traditional values, and that 
high tech research, R&D, and state of the art innovations can be reconcilable with 
several thousand-year-old approaches.
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Introduction
China’s economy has been performing extraordinarily well in the last three and 
a half decades. The new approach, called reform and opening up, have transformed 
the entire economy. Central planning has been gradually substituted for market 
forces, while state (or, as it is called in China, common) by private property. The 
systemic transformation, however, has been quite different from those in Central and 
Eastern Europe, because the political structure in China has remained more or less 
intact. The Communist Party has been very successful at preserving political power, 
while the economy has been going through a fundamental shift from a command 
economy to a market economy. From a developing country China has become a 
fast growing emerging one, with growth rates in the region of 10 percent. In 2011 
the country became the second largest economy (in Purchasing Power Parity), and 
the largest exporter in the world. Journalists, politicians and scientifi c researchers 
all regard China as the Workshop of the World. There are also estimations about 
the exact date when China will overtake the United States, and will be the largest 
economy. To be a real superpower, however, a country needs much more than a fast 
growing economy and an unparalleled number of inhabitants. Per capita income, 
technological and innovative capacities, military power, purchasing power, living 
standards, and the state of the environment (to name a few) are fi elds where China 
has huge defi cits. In this paper we address the area of technology policy, R&D, 
and innovations, trying to assess the results, and the problems of the country. We 
will look back to Chinese history to seek for continuity of approaches, especially 
from the era of the so called Chinese Renaissance, and the decades of pre-reform 
communism.
In the fi rst part of the paper we will assess the huge success that China achieved 
between the 10th and the 15th century in the fi eld of technological progress. At that 
time China was more advanced than Europe, in fact, it was the most advanced 
country in the world. One of the most enigmatic questions of history is: Why did 
the industrial revolution occur in Europe, and not in China (Nielsen 2010: 23)? 
According to some historians China was in the threshold of this breakthrough in 
around 1400. The breakthrough, however, happened in Europe, and China slowly 
fell behind. What were the main causes of this decline? Are there any similarities 
between the conditions existed nearly one thousand years ago, and the setup of 
today’s system? We will conclude that the approach to innovations and the way 
the state bureaucracy handles them are not totally different from the traditional 
patterns. Of course, to understand the functioning of the Chinese innovation system 
it is interesting, but not at all enough to sketch some distant historical analogies. 
Chapter 2.indd   58 2012.05.14.   0:10:11
59
Therefore, we will seek for other sources of explanations, too. Because every area 
of the Chinese economy is strongly infl uenced by political considerations, R&D 
expenditures and innovations are not exceptions, too. On the contrary, these are 
areas where strategic interests of the Party often overwrite economic rationality, and 
where inherited institutions of the past can still determine the ultimate directions 
of the processes. As Baark states it: “emerging institutional fabric governing 
innovation in Chinese society represents an evolving synthesis of values and 
routines that have been formed over centuries on the one hand, and new principles 
introduced as part of ongoing political and economic change on the other hand” 
(Baark 2007: 338-339). In the second part of the paper, therefore, we will analyze 
the evolution of the Chinese innovation system in the reform era, and will show 
how communist refl exes affect today’s processes.
Because the title of this paper promises some insights into the Chinese 
innovation system, we cannot avoid presenting some current tendencies and some 
basic statistical data. In the fi nal part of the paper we will assess how the legacies 
of the past infl uence current trends and approaches, and how these affect the 
prospects of China’s technological progress. We will show that technologically 
China still lags behind the most advanced countries quite fundamentally, and it 
is not probable that this lag will disappear in the foreseeable future. We are also 
skeptical that technological development from above can be much more successful 
than development based on market competition. In fact, the more involved the state 
is in the processes, the more probable it is that some fundamental problem may 
occur in the system. While we are truly amazed by the economic success of China, 
according to our analysis the country is not ready yet to achieve better results in the 
fi eld of technology and innovations than the West.
The Rise and Fall of Chinese Technological Leadership
Due to favorable circumstances technological development in China accelerated 
to an unprecedented high level in the 10th-11th century. By the beginning of the 13th 
century China had become the most advanced civilization in the world. China at 
that time was far ahead of Europe, and when Marco Polo arrived in the country 
in 1275, he was astonished. Almost every aspect of life was affected by the new 
innovations, and living standards rose steadily despite rapid population growth. 
Both domestic and foreign trade was fl ourishing, countless luxurious goods were 
sold at local markets, and the infrastructure was highly developed. Though the 
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empire was held together by the army and the class of the bureaucrats, it was 
the market and the fi erce competition between the participants that provided the 
country with such a high dynamism. Of course, the role of the state was very 
signifi cant, too. Besides upholding law and order, the state was responsible for 
maintaining and expanding infrastructure. In a country where feeding the people 
is of the highest importance, the state of the canals and other irrigation devices is 
perhaps the most fundamental service the government should supply. We will see 
that four or fi ve centuries later exactly this will be the fi eld where the state will fail, 
causing stagnation and starvation.
Technological advances of this era are so numerous that it would take a long 
book to count them all. Therefore, as an illustration, we mention here only some 
of them. As always, everything started with the transformation of agriculture. 
Improvements in cultivation of rice were the main cause that contributed to 
this ancient “green revolution”. Wet fi eld techniques and hydraulic engineering 
allowed rapid spread of rice cultivation in areas throughout the country. Other very 
important agricultural innovations include the use of the iron plow, seed drills, 
weeding rakes, and the deep-tooth harrow (Mokyr 1990: 209). These tools were 
designed to achieve higher output on a given plot, and to feed more people in a 
given village. The main goal in applying them was not to save on labor, but to save 
on land. From this perspective these agricultural innovations were quite different 
from those in Europe, which were rather labor-saving in nature. Paths of innovation 
always refl ect the needs, the goals, and the problems of a society, while new tools 
and new solutions address the factor of production in short stack. In this case, in 
China, the scarcest resource was land. It is not surprising therefore, that peasants, 
engineers, and state bureaucrats were all striving to increase the yield of the plots.
After the fi rst millennium increasing productivity in agriculture made it 
possible to regroup labor force to other activities like trade or industry. Although 
industries in these centuries were totally different from modern ones, the main 
goals were the same: to produce goods. As population grew the needs for different 
goods were growing, too. To match this demand new techniques and processes 
were developed, and traditional technologies were transformed as well. The 
most important changes came from iron smelting. The use of blast furnaces to 
cast iron, and to refi ne wrought iron from pig iron dates back to the 3rd century 
B.C. Techniques were continuously improved, and in the Middle Ages the overall 
production of iron in China far exceeded that of in Europe, even on a per capita 
basis. In textiles, Chinese developed spinning wheel at about the same time as 
in Europe, but it spread much faster than in the West. They used waterpower for 
various purposes, and developed water clocks for measuring time. This invention, 
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however, was not supposed to use by the commoners, rather it was a masterwork 
of Chinese engineers for the ruling elite (Mokyr 1990: 210-213).
Perhaps one of the most well known Chinese inventions was the compass. 
Along with ocean-going junks it allowed maritime trade, and even exploration of 
distant lands. In the 14th and 15th centuries Chinese led huge expeditions to India 
and East Africa. The main goal of these adventures was to spread the glory of 
China, and, unlike Europeans, they were not interested in goods of other countries. 
Chinese invented paper, at least one millennium earlier than it reached Europe. 
The use of paper for writing was very common in China, but they also used it for 
clothing, as toilet paper, wallpaper, and paper money. This latter invention indicates 
that economic activity, and especially trade between distant cities, reached a level, 
where adequate fi nancial intermediaries became absolutely necessary. Finally, we 
should mention some advancement in chemistry, too. Genuine porcelain, lacquers, 
explosives, and pharmaceuticals all signaled the very high level of practical 
knowledge that Chinese craftsmen possessed. Considering all these developments, 
it is very diffi cult to imagine how China could not stay in the forefront of 
technological development for the following centuries.
Approximately at the same time when Renaissance started to appear in Italian 
city states, the pace of technological development in China gradually slowed 
down, and by the 17th century it stalled completely. Technological stagnation, on 
the other hand, didn’t mean economic stagnation, because China has been able to 
feed a rapidly growing population since then. True innovations, however, has not 
appeared any more. Until the end of the 19th century economic growth was based 
upon population growth, increase in arable land, and extensive growth of domestic 
trade. As we stated before, technological development and innovations in China 
were depended on the state bureaucracy. We do not say that centralized policy is 
less potent in achieving success; it is possible that an extremely talented ruler can 
over perform competitive markets. The problem is that extremely talented rulers 
are very rare phenomena. And because technological development is a long run 
undertaking, a centralized system would need numerous talented rulers to follow 
each other: “The absence of political competition did not mean that technological 
progress could not take place, but it did mean that one decision maker could deal 
it a mortal blow” (Mokyr 1990: 231). Such “bad” rulers, of course, existed in 
Europe, too, but their power and ability to undermine development was much less. 
Innovators in Europe were able to move from one court to another if the political 
climate deteriorated severely.
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The slowing down of technological development, at least partially, may be 
attributed to the conservative approach of the leaders in China. Big changes in 
technology always induce social and economic changes as well, which can 
have deep destabilizing effects upon the society. Therefore, the ruling elite, the 
Mandarins, were not interested in introducing fundamental innovations; instead, 
they were interested in maintaining the status quo. Some historians say that there is 
an inherent tendency in Chinese society towards social harmony and avoiding deep 
confl icts. Chinese history, however, shows no clear evidence that could prove this 
thesis, and as we saw earlier, there were centuries when technological progress was 
exceptionally fast. It is much more probable that it was only the ruling class who 
were interested in slowing down progress to preserve the power. And because it was 
the elite who was only able to carry out successful research projects (like dams and 
canals), technological progress was depended upon their intentions. When priorities 
changed, and technological progress became less important, it was not so surprising 
that important innovations slowly died out. The incentive system of the Chinese 
society was designed to preserve social structures also through the education and 
employment of the bureaucrats. Formal education always rested upon studying 
ancient texts, and there were no room for new ideas or innovative thoughts. After 
stepping up the ladder, all the bureaucrats became the main defenders of the status 
quo, without too much interest in carrying out innovative projects.
Considering all these factors it was almost inevitable that this highly 
bureaucratized system was not able to maintain the technological edge that China 
enjoyed between the 10th and the 15th centuries. Though it is eventually possible 
that a centrally governed innovation system with a well-educated and effi cient 
bureaucracy has the potential to be better than a system based on competition, it 
is highly improbable that the former system would be very durable. There are, of 
course, rulers who understand the importance of technological progress, but there are 
also ones, who are simply not interested in innovations. In China the radical change 
in the approach to innovations came in the 15th century. The state bureaucracy were 
not interested in spending so much money to promote innovations, and there were 
no other groups in the society who could have undertaken this task: “By the fi fteenth 
century, the role of the imperial government in both invention and innovation was 
far less remarkable than it had been in medieval times, and no other entity in China 
was in a position to replace the state in promoting technological progress” (Mokyr 
1990: 238).
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R&D Policy in the Reform Era
The leaders of the People’s Republic of China have treated R&D as a strategic 
sector of the economy. Due to the very limited resources available, however, they 
selected some strategic areas where investments were made. As an ambitious 
military power China poured money into nuclear development, but traditional 
military technology also was prioritized. The fi rst atomic bomb had been fi nished 
by 1964, and the fi rst hydrogen bomb by 1967. These achievements propelled the 
country to a highly illustrious club of great powers. In the 50s China followed 
the Soviet Union in almost every respect, so it is not surprising that all the new 
technologies came from the “Big Brother”. The aid from the Soviet Union was 
eventually more than simple technology export; it incorporated export of the whole 
innovation system, too. As the fi rst step of this process, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences was founded. The main goal of this decision was to centralize both the 
scientifi c life and the R&D efforts of the country, but it was also very important to 
coordinate the various actions according to the priorities of the Chinese Communist 
Party.
After the break with the Soviet Union in 1962, China was left alone in the 
fi eld of technological development. There were no new partners available, who 
could have helped the country to achieve its ambitious goals. From that time, along 
with other sectors, China had to accommodate itself to a self-suffi cient, autark 
technology policy. Two main strategies helped this approach: the fi rst was importing 
complete factories with technologies embodied in it, which they tried to imitate, 
while the second was home-made developments of existing Soviet technologies. 
The success, however, was very limited, and technological backwardness of the 
country had increased signifi cantly until the mid 70s. The growing lag increasingly 
annoyed the party leaders, and contributed to the adoption of the strategy of Reform 
and Opening Up.
After 1978 China had no uniform approach to R&D and innovation policy, rather 
we can talk about the coexistence of various strategies. Though these strategies 
have been present for decades, the emphasis moved from one to another as new 
possibilities and directions opened up. To assess the importance of these strategies 
Naughton (Naughton 2007) divided them into seven groups. Each approach was 
viable in itself, but the main factor behind the success of this policy was the 
pragmatic interaction between them. In the fi rst group we can fi nd self-suffi cient 
developments like the two bombs. Although these projects were highly successful, 
they had no side effects in the economy, and remained isolated. With no spill-
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over effects the signifi cance of this strategy was continually diminishing over time. 
Research under the aegis of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has remained isolated 
as well. They have actually managed to create the fi rst Chinese supercomputer, but 
it was rather the apex of the performance of the Chinese scientifi c elite than the 
fruit of an effi ciently working national innovation system. Thus it became evident 
that other strategies were needed to narrow the gap between China and the West.
At the end of the 70s it seemed that China had huge oil reserves which could 
be exploited fairly easily. Based upon possible future revenues party leaders began 
to formulate highly ambitious and costly policies in various areas. In technology 
policy this meant a new wave of imports of key technologies that was very much 
needed to accelerate catching up. They spent huge amounts of money to modernize 
existing plants, and to buy new ones as well. This strategy, however, turned out to be 
ineffi cient and very expensive at the same time. Because most of the projects were 
approved at a lower level, and were not centrally planned, without coordination the 
same technology were often bought several times. Soon it turned out, unfortunately, 
that the planned oil extraction had no real foundations, so sources to buy new 
technologies dried up abruptly.
As a result of the policy of Reform and Opening Up more and more 
multinational companies have entered China. Party leaders have soon realized the 
huge possibilities appearing in their negotiating position, and started to demand key 
technologies from the companies in return for access to the Chinese market. The 
biggest companies, however, were not ready to give up their monopolistic access 
to these technologies. Though China was a huge market, at the end of the 80s 
it was not totally different from other South East Asian economies. Negotiations 
between the Chinese government and the huge multinational companies were, 
therefore, very long, and the standpoints remained quite distant from each other. 
Problems were also arising after the signings of the contracts, due to different legal 
approaches, and the different interpretation of the texts. Successful negotiations 
were rare, and they were rather exceptions to the general failures. Some companies, 
like Alcatel (Mu-Lee 2005), however, as fi rst movers, were able to break into the 
Chinese market. Chinese leaders soon realized that it was more profi table to create 
competition between foreign fi rms during the different rounds of negotiations. 
Despite these considerations the bilateral approach remained quite strong in the 
upcoming decades, particularly in some areas, like talks about atomic energy 
(Naughton 2007).
The failure of the oil project had a severe impact upon direct purchases of 
technology, and it made the party leaders reconsider the functioning of the 
whole innovation system. Financing the largest state research institutions was 
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very expensive, and the results were far from satisfactory. As a consequence, the 
government reconsidered the administrative distribution of research funds, and, 
like in the economy as a whole, they started to give way for market forces in the 
technology sector. A new system of tenders was introduced which was coordinated 
by some huge agencies. The most important of them was the National Science 
Fund. Despite promoting competition in the innovation system, the infl uence of 
the government remained exceptionally strong in carrying out its priorities. The 
main difference between this new and the old system was the directness of state 
intervention.
Inadequate technology diffusion to other sectors of the economy, however, 
still remained a serious defi ciency. As a new approach research institutes and 
universities were given freedom in selecting their partners. They were allowed 
to cooperate with business enterprises, and to create affi liates. In this way new 
enterprises were born, which were assumed to promote priorities of the state, but 
in a much more indirect, competitive way. They also enjoyed more freedom in 
shaping their policies than ordinary state owned enterprises. One of the biggest 
Chinese technology companies, Lenovo, has followed the same path. It was born 
as an affi liate of the Institute of Computer Studies of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in 1984. In the beginning it sold computers, but soon started to take part 
in the low technology processes of manufacturing. After a little more than a decade 
Lenovo became one of the most important players in the world. By 1995 Lenovo 
had reached a market share of 3, and by 2005 a share of 10 percent in the world. 
The main sources of the enormous success of the company were the low costs and 
the imitation of existing technologies. In 2004 Lenovo successfully bought up the 
personal computers division of IBM, becoming a truly global company. This was a 
sign of the aggressive expansionist policies of the largest Chinese fi rms (Naughton 
2007).
The most important strategy of the policy of Reform and Opening Up was, for 
sure, the partial and controlled liberalization of capital infl ows. In the beginning 
foreign companies were only allowed to form joint ventures with Chinese state 
owned enterprises, and only in geographically designated areas. These were the 
so called Special Economic Zones which were enclaves in China, and had very 
little linkages to the mainland economy. These small and restricted areas, however, 
began to increase both in size and numbers, and by the 90s they had become the 
engines of growth of the whole economy. With the transformation of the zones 
the institutional setup of joint ventures has also changed. Majority ownership of 
the Chinese parties was no more required, and full foreign ownership was also 
allowed some years later. Despite the huge capital infl ows technology diffusion 
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and technology absorption have been limited, and most of the innovations and 
patents were attributable to foreign fi rms.
Finally, the government has been continuously subsidizing domestic enterprises. 
Although, this type of funding was the most common in the socialist era, subsidies 
related to research and development in the reform era became available to a much 
wider spectrum of enterprises than before. Now it is possible for also non-state 
enterprises to get subsidies, and it is also possible, that a private enterprise becomes 
a true national champion. The most common means to promote R&D are tax 
alleviations and low-interest credit. Though the government seemingly retreated 
from this sector as a participant, through both direct and indirect funding it still 
controls the processes (Naughton 2007: 361).
Results and Future Challenges
To evaluate the role of China in worldwide technological progress, we need 
to approach the topic from different perspectives. In this paper we have analyzed 
the historical and institutional background of the question. Now we fi rst assess the 
results that China has achieved in the fi eld of technology and R&D; and after that 
we turn to the problems and challenges that are yet to be solved. These latter factors 
either have a huge adverse impact upon development prospects, or sometimes 
they make it impossible to achieve a true breakthrough. Although the main goal 
of the Chinese elite currently is only to narrow the gap between the country and 
the developed west, in the long run they obviously seek to secure the leading role. 
Therefore it is very important to assess the main factors that may affect this goal. 
We also try to highlight the relationship between innovation systems of the past 
and the current institutional setting. These links are the primary evidence that path 
dependency and institutional continuity are much more important in understanding 
today’s processes than we would have thought.
Since 1979 China has been performing very well in the fi eld of technology and 
R&D. More than half a century ago China was one of the most underdeveloped 
and poorest countries in the world. By now it is the second largest economy in the 
world after the USA and in front of Japan (at Purchasing Power Parity). The change 
has been very large, even on a per capita basis. As a result, China has become a 
middle-income country. Technological development has always been treated as a 
prominent feature of the Chinese economy: technology import and acquiring of 
new technologies have been of high importance. Despite these commitments R&D 
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expenditures show mixed patterns. According to the latest available fi gures (NBSC 
Web) in the 80s and in the fi rst part of the 90s they were decreasing, and it was 
only after 1995 that the numbers began to rise. In the pre-reform era science and 
technology expenditures were at about 1 percent of the GDP. Due to the ineffi cient 
and wasteful system, however, the results were disappointing. As the reforms 
gained momentum R&D expenditures fell to 0.57 percent of GDP. This could 
be mainly attributed to fi scal problems of the central government. While direct 
contributions from the government were cut back, private enterprises were not 
yet strong enough to provide new sources. In Central and Eastern Europe, where 
the systemic transformation was much more complete, and the political system 
was transformed as well, private R&D expenditures quickly surpassed government 
spending. In China, however, these large fi rms remained under state control, and 
were not in a position to fi nance research and development. It turned out that no 
other players could undertake it, like fi ve centuries ago, only the government. 
After the tax reform of 1994 (Wu 2005) new sources became available, and the 
government began to increase R&D spending once again (though mainly through 
indirect ways). While direct subsidies to the large state owned enterprises were 
reduced substantially, R&D expenditures rose signifi cantly, surpassing 1.4 percent 
of GDP. This rapid increase is remarkable, because GDP has also been rising at a 
breathtaking pace.
In 2006 the R&D expenditures to GDP ratio was at about 1.5 percent in 
China. How can we assess this result? The same data for the USA was 3.4, for 
the EU25 1.8, and for Japan 2.6 percent (OECD 2008: 496), which means that 
despite the rapid development, there is still a considerable gap between China 
and the West. According to data, in 2006 the two thirds of the expenditures 
could be attributed to business enterprises, compared to less than half of them 
in 1995. The business sector became much more important than before not only 
in financing, but also in performing R&D. In this respect business enterprises 
reached 70 percent. In the R&D sector there were about 700 thousand workers 
in 1995, while in 2006 the number of researchers surpassed 1 and a half million. 
This number is comparable that of in the whole European Union. There is also a 
huge increase in the number of graduates which increased to 3 million in 2006 
from 800 thousand in 1995. As China has moved upwards in the technology 
ladder high tech exports and imports have also increased substantially to 12 
and 10 percent, respectively. One more striking data: during this time period 
the number of scientific and technical publications have increased from 26 
thousand to 150 thousand, which is almost 7 percent of the world output.
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As we saw, China had signifi cantly raised R&D expenditures, and by 2005 
it became the sixth largest country in the world in this respect. Beside this huge 
success, however, there are circumstances that could seriously hinder further 
development. As China is becoming more and more advanced, potential for further 
extensive development is shrinking. Obviously there will be a point where China 
has to transform its extensive growth to an intensive one. And preconditions of 
intensive development are very different from current ones. What are the most 
problematic aspects of China’s national innovation system? Research papers (e.g. 
Schaaper 2009) point to two areas where the diffi culties are especially large. The 
fi rst one is the inadequate supply of human resources. Despite the increasing 
number of graduate students, the pool is still not big enough, and the excess demand 
for quality labor force is growing. At higher levels of technological development 
there is a need for even more specialized and sophisticated knowledge, which can 
be obtained only from a well-structured and fl exible higher education system, 
and from motivated business enterprises. These are, however, not yet present in 
large numbers in the Chinese system. The second area where experts fi nd serious 
defi ciencies is the institutional background that defi nes the processes of knowledge 
transfer and innovation. This includes antitrust laws, protection of intellectual 
property rights, fi nancial practices, and methods of corporate governance.
The proper functioning of markets requires adequate antitrust regulation. 
Extensive subsidies and unpredictable, discretionary policies from the part of the 
government may bias fair competition. This can have a detrimental effect upon 
economic effi ciency and on the pace of technological development in particular. 
Everybody knows that the protection of intellectual property rights in China is 
much weaker than in Europe or in the USA. We mean not only the illegal copying 
of products and software, but the lack of protection in innovation processes. 
Effi cient functioning of the innovation system also requires that benefi ts of new 
innovations remain at the innovator, and be protected by laws. As long as private 
developers are not fully protected, and there is a danger that their innovations can 
be stolen, incentives to pursue innovative activities are diminished signifi cantly. 
Beside these problems there exists a structural one as well. The Chinese innovation 
system is far from coherent. There are huge leaks and differences both in regional 
and in functional respects. It is very diffi cult to link advanced and seriously 
underdeveloped areas, or technologically not compatible businesses. There are lots 
of “innovative islands” in the economy with no real linkages to their environments. 
This creates a gap between the producers and the consumers of knowledge.
Our results also show that while Chinese R&D expenditures are increasing 
very fast, new, innovative enterprises appear in the horizon, and the country is 
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rapidly reducing the existing technological gap, numerous problems jeopardize the 
prospects of a truly successful technological giant. What is more, these defi ciencies 
seem to be the same as those of some hundred years earlier. Since the 15th century 
due to the inadequate institutional setup China has begun to drop behind in the 
technological competition, and failed to maintain its edge over Europe. The single 
most important handicap of the Chinese system has been the lack of real competition. 
And without fi erce competition prospects of new, fundamental innovations are 
very slim. This is one rare point in economics where the most authors concur that 
the most important incentive of innovative activities is competition (e.g. Kornai 
2011: 146). In the absence of competition momentum will be vanishing in the 
long run, and the pace of technological progress inevitably will be reduced. The 
studying of processes in medieval China strongly supports this thesis, and the fall 
of Chinese leadership from the 15th until the 20th century can be explained very 
well by this theory. Considering all these factors we argue that the transformation 
of the Chinese innovation system from the current stage of extensive growth to a 
more sophisticated, intensive stage can only be possible if a proper competitive 
environment is created with all the institutions we mentioned earlier. This could be 
the only way for China to be a true technological superpower regaining its earlier 
glory.
On the other hand, complete liberalization and the creation of a truly market 
based institutional framework might undermine political stability. There are no 
other sectors in the Chinese economy where the reforms have been so deep, and 
there are no signs either that we could anticipate such a breakthrough in any areas. 
This, of course, refl ects the logic of the political processes in China. Political control 
is much more important for the leaders than effi ciency. It is common knowledge 
that in the fi eld of technological development and R&D the true propelling force is 
competition, but too much competition can harm political stability and the power of 
the Communist Party. Therefore, party leaders are very reluctant to give way to full 
liberalization, and are interested in maintaining bureaucratic coordination rather. 
Similarly to the way bureaucracy handled innovations some seven or eight hundred 
years ago, radical innovations from private businesses are not truly welcomed. 
Innovations, of course, are good things, but only up to the point where they do not 
endanger political and social stability, and the leading role of the Party. We argue 
that until the Chinese political system is so centralized and bureaucratic, there are 
no real prospects for the technology sector to be a true challenger in the international 
fi eld. Nevertheless, it is possible that it can achieve huge success in case of existing 
technologies, but really groundbreaking innovations and technologies possibly will 
be developed elsewhere.
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Conclusions
In the last three decades China has achieved extraordinary success in economic 
terms. From an underdeveloped, poor status it has become a fast growing, middle-
income country. As China was becoming a more and more important player in the 
international fi eld, the need to modernize the national innovation system became a 
pressing concern. The Communist Party decided to make special attention to R&D 
and innovations, and attempted to transform the system. They gave way to market 
forces, but the ultimate control remained with the Party. As a result of the reforms, 
extensive development accelerated, and China started to narrow the technology 
gap. Building upon this success a new, highly ambitious goal began to evolve in 
the Party elite. They wanted China to be the new technology leader of the world 
in the foreseeable future. They think that if it is possible to overtake the United 
States in terms of GDP, it would be also possible to take the lead from them in the 
technology fi eld.
To assess the chances of this objective we have turned to the past, and studied 
the roots of the rise and fall of technological leadership China had been witnessing 
between the 10th and 15th centuries. We have found that agrarian innovations led 
to increased output in the countryside, which enabled faster development in the 
cities. Specialization increased, and an unprecedented era of prosperity emerged. 
Innovations were burgeoning, and the state just did what it had to do: it created 
and maintained the proper framework for development. After several external 
and internal shocks, however, the pace of development decreased. The imperial 
government was less and less interested in innovative processes, and from the 18th 
century it has failed to provide even the basic infrastructural environment. By the 
20th century China had became a poor, severely underdeveloped country.
The next huge modernization wave in China began after the foundation of the 
People’s Republic. It was at least partially based upon the relative success of the 
20s and 30s, and was helped by the Soviet Union. Despite the efforts, China was not 
able to reduce its backwardness, and by the late 70s it became evident that it needed 
an entirely new approach. The main problem was the highly ineffi cient innovation 
system, which was controlled by the centralized state bureaucracy. To enhance the 
functioning of the system the Party leaders made an attempt to substitute planning 
for some market competition. This was achieved, at least partially, by opening up the 
economy to foreign direct investment. The resulting system became a hybrid one, 
with elements of central planning, and competitive forces as well. Although results 
have been promising, several serious defi ciencies have been remaining. Quality 
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human resource supply is still narrow. Inadequate antitrust regulation along with 
discretionary and unpredictable government subsidies cause reduced competition 
and innovation.  Defi ciencies, on the other hand, in the incentive system make 
it diffi cult for businesses to plan and successfully introduce innovations. This is 
mainly because of the lack of protection of intellectual property rights, which almost 
always undermines the efforts of innovative forces. Finally, there is a problem 
arising in the fi eld of corporate governance. Although some improvements can 
be found in this regard, organizational processes are still pervaded by traditional 
refl exes.
Why not to transform the whole system, then, into a market based competitive 
one? The answer lies in the logic of the political system. The innovation system 
can not be completely transformed, because due to potentially radical changes it 
could undermine social and political stability, and, what is more, could endanger 
the power of the ruling elite. This would be by far a too expensive price for the 
Communist Party to pay. Instead, to preserve the power structure by any means 
is the main priority of the Party. This priority is eventually the most important 
as well, and it constitutes the fundamental base of the current Chinese system. 
Considering all these factors, we can argue that until political structures are intact, 
the national innovation system cannot be improved signifi cantly. Thus if China 
wants to be a technological superpower in the future, it should carry out a more 
complete transformation of its innovation system, even if it could endanger the 
political stability. Without this decision the country probably remains only a really 
good follower of the technology leaders.
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